






antecedent	numerical	structure	in	which	measurement	outcomes	are	represented.		This	antecedent	structure	blocks	the	possibility	of	gerrymandered	categories	that	crosscut	the	joints	of	nature.		Consequently,	successful	measurement	constitutes	a	substantive	enough	epistemic	achievement	that	we	may	legitimately	“factor	out”	the	contribution	to	success	made	by	human	interests,	and	accept	the	outcome	as	representing	an	objective	feature	of	the	world.				 After	surveying	the	motivations	for	measurement	coherentism,	I	elaborate	on	the	notion	of	“successful”	measurement,	and	why	it	poses	a	challenge	to	coherentism.		The	paper	concludes	with	a	more	careful	articulation	of	the	distinctive	features	of	fixed	point	realism.		§2	Epistemic	Loops	in	Measurement	Practice			 Contemporary	measurement	coherentism	is	motivated	by	two	types	of	case	study,	each	identifying	a	different	kind	of	epistemic	“loop,”	or	feedback	process	driving	knowledge	formation.		Chang	and	van	Fraassen	emphasize	diachronic	examples	of	epistemic	iteration,	where	the	feedback	process	extends	over	several	stages	of	mutual	influence	between	theory	change	and	refinement	of	measurement	practice.		A	different	kind	of	epistemic	loop	has	been	discussed	by	Tal	and	metrologist	Mari,	who	highlight	the	role	of	models	in	the	calibration	of	measurement	instruments	and	the	assignment	of	quantity	values,	illustrating	a	synchronic	epistemic	interdependence	between	theory	and	measurement.		§2.1	Epistemic	Iteration			 Chang	(2004)	defines	epistemic	iteration	as	“a	process	in	which	successive	stages	of	knowledge,	each	building	on	the	preceding	one,	are	created	in	order	to	enhance	the	achievement	of	certain	epistemic	goals”	(45).		He	takes	this	process	to	support	a	“progressive	coherentism”:	on	the	one	hand,	the	criteria	for	measurement	success	are	internal	to	a	practice,	so	scientific	knowledge	does	not	rest	on	an	independent	foundation;	on	the	other	hand,	these	internal	criteria	may	be	used	to	evaluate	new	practices	as	improvements	or	refinements	on	their	predecessors,	thereby	allowing	for	scientific	progress	(in	contrast	to	traditional	coherentism,	Chang	2007).		In	the	context	of	measurement,	this	means	that	later	measurement	practices	may	be	understood	as	in	some	sense	“better”	than	earlier	ones,	yet	these	“epistemic	achievements”	should	not	be	cashed	out	as	greater	degree	of	correspondence	to	quantities	in	the	world.			 For	instance,	thermometry	as	a	practice	begins	with	subjective	assignments	of	relative	heat	on	the	basis	of	our	bodily	experiences.		Noticing	that	fluids	appear	to	change	volume	in	rough	correspondence	with	these	subjective	sensations,	one	may	construct	a	thermoscope,	or	device	allowing	comparison	of	relative	fluid	volumes	in	different	circumstances.		Already	a	theoretical	leap	is	required	to	identify	the	cause	of	these	changes	in	relative	volume	with	the	cause	of	our	differing	subjective	sensations,	especially	given	the	discrepancies	between	these	sensations	and	our	thermoscopic	readings	(e.g.	contrary	to	experience,	caves	are	warmer	in	summer	than	they	are	in	winter).		Nevertheless,	the	move	to	the	thermoscope	constitutes	an	epistemic	achievement,	in	the	sense	that	it	allows	for	greater	regularity	in	the	assignment	of	relative	temperatures,	both	
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across	contexts	and	across	observers.		A	similar	pattern	is	seen	in	the	move	from	thermoscope	to	thermometer,	which	enables	assignment	of	numbers	to	temperatures.		Numerical	representation	constitutes	a	yet	greater	epistemic	achievement,	insofar	as	it	allows	comparison	of	temperature	assignments	across	devices.		Nevertheless,	this	practice	does	not	itself	guarantee	greater	veracity	of	temperature	assignments,	since	it	rests	on	the	assumption	that	temperature	varies	linearly	with	changes	in	the	height	of	thermometric	fluid.		But	this	assumption	cannot	itself	be	verified,	as	that	would	require	access	to	temperature	in	the	world	by	some	means	independent	of	thermometry.		Similar	achievements,	(seemingly)	inextricably	entangled	with	theory,	may	be	seen	at	each	further	stage	in	the	development	of	thermometric	practice.		 The	moral	of	this	case	study	is	the	historical	contingency	of	thermometry,	and	thus	of	its	results.		At	each	stage	in	the	development	of	thermometry,	an	advance	in	theory	was	required	to	extend	measurement	practice.		Internal	criteria	of	consistency	and	increased	precision	in	the	assignment	of	numerical	values	establish	the	new	practice	as	an	advance	over	the	previous	one.		Yet,	the	application	of	these	criteria	is	not	empirically	constrained.		When	one	assumes	that	“temperature”	(whatever	it	may	be)	varies	linearly	with	changes	in	the	height	of	the	indicator	column	in	an	air	thermometer,	one	is	making	an	assumption	both	necessary	for	measurement	progress	and	in	principle	non-empirical,	since	no	independent	access	to	“temperature,”	outside	the	behavior	of	the	very	devices	and	procedures	under	investigation,	is	possible:	“Prior	to	the	











extent	that	it	returns	the	same	result	when	performed	repeatedly.		The	number	of	significant	figures	in	a	numerical	assignment	indicates	the	degree	of	measurement	precision,	since	these	characterize	the	size	of	the	region	within	which	repeated	measurements	fall.		 Coherentists	stress	the	fact	that	increased	precision	is	a	purely	internal	criterion	for	improving	measurement.		Here,	however,	I	want	to	stress	the	way	in	which	increased	precision	constitutes	a	qualitatively	different,	and	more	impressive,	epistemic	achievement	than	other	forms	of	empirical	success,	such	as	qualitative	prediction	or	improved	coherence	of	classification.		These	qualitative	achievements	are	subject	to	worries	about	semantic	and	theoretical	holism:	one	may	always	succeed	in	classification,	or	correct	qualitative	prediction,	by	suitably	redrawing	the	boundaries	of	one’s	theoretical	concepts.		As	LaPorte	(2004)	argues,	when	faced	with	anomalies	in	the	relationship	between	guinea	pigs	and	prototypical	rodents,	or	birds	and	dinosaurs,	scientists	face	a	choice	whether	to	expand	or	contract	their	previous	categories	to	include	or	exclude	perceived	outliers	(a	similar	case	is	made	by	Slater	2017	for	Pluto	and	planethood).		Nothing	about	the	prior	conceptual	framework	itself	forces	this	choice	one	way	or	another,	nor	do	demands	for	internal	consistency.		 Measurement	is	different	from	mere	categorization	precisely	because	it	maps	states	into	a	metric	space.		The	crucial	point	to	note	here	is	that	a	metric	space	has	antecedent	structure:	the	distances	between	points	on	the	real	line,	and	the	algebraic	relationships	between	them,	are	fixed	before	we	employ	it	to	represent	height	or	temperature	or	electric	charge.		This	antecedent	structure	constrains	the	relationship	between	measurement	outcomes,	independently	restricting	our	assessment	of	them	as	same	or	different,	or	converging	or	not,	in	a	manner	impervious	to	ad	hoc	revision.		Increase	in	precision	occurs	when	successive	measurement	practices	are	able	to	shrink	distances	(between	repeated	measurements	within	each	practice)	determined	by	the	metric	of	the	representing	space.		Thus,	the	metric	of	this	space	serves	two	functions:	(i)	it	represents	the	distances	between	different	measured	quantities,	but	(ii)	it	also	provides	a	directed	metric	for	improving	measurement	of	a	single	quantity,	since	it	determines	the	distances	between	repeated	measurements	that	characterizes	their	precision.		Consequently,	pace	van	Fraassen,	attempts	to	increase	precision	are	empirically	constrained,	since	this	directed	metric	for	improvement	can	only	be	satisfied	through	the	cooperation	of	nature:	if	nature	is	not	sufficiently	stable	where	we	probe	it,	no	choice,	convention,	or	increased	coherence	can	reduce	the	distances	between	our	repeated	attempts	to	measure	it.		Some	examples	will	illustrate	this	point.		 Consider,	for	instance,	determinations	of	the	boiling	point	of	water.		Chang	(2004,	Ch.	1)	surveys	the	sequence	of	choice	points	in	the	early	practice	of	thermometry	leading	to	relative	stability	in	the	measurement	of	this	temperature:	what	are	the	visual	indicators	of	boiling,	where	should	the	thermometer	be	positioned,	what	should	be	the	shape	of	the	vessel	holding	the	water,	its	material,	etc.3		Decisions	on	each	of	these	points	affect	the	relative	stability	in	the	thermometric	reading,	illustrating	the	naivety	of	a	view	on	which																																																									3	The	issue	here	is	the	phenomenon	of	“superheating,”	whereby	water	with	relatively	little	dissolved	gas,	or	in	a	flask	with	very	small	surface	area,	may	be	heated	to	a	higher	temperature	without	bubbling.	
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boiling	point	is	a	simple	phenomena	merely	waiting	to	be	observed.		Nevertheless,	in	committing	to	represent	the	boiling	point	numerically,	investigators	subjected	themselves	to	a	criterion	for	success	distinct	from	coherence.		If	the	numbers	assigned	by	thermometers	within	this-shaped	vessels	and	that-shaped	ones	differ	during	phenomenologically	similar	bubblings,	then	the	distance	between	those	numbers	provides	a	criterion	of	difference	that	must	be	respected	if	thermometric	practice	is	to	count	as	measurement.		Restricting	attention	to	those	vessels	that	minimize	distances	between	numerical	outcomes	is	thus	not	a	mere	choice,	or	gerrymandering	of	the	category	“boiling,”	since	it	is	forced	upon	the	investigator	by	an	antecedent	metric	for	success.			 Likewise,	consider	again	the	determination	of	UTC	through	the	retrospective	weighting	of	the	comparison	set	of	atomic	clocks.		For	Tal,	the	success	of	this	procedure	is	evidence	for	stability	in	our	clocks,	but	not	for	any	human-independent	feature	of	the	world.		Nevertheless,	UTC	is	constrained	by	the	world	in	two	distinct	ways.		First,	through	empirical	contact	with	caesium	atoms.		While	this	contact	is	mediated	by	models,	these	models	themselves	are	the	result	of	convergent	measurements	of	atomic	phenomena	through	a	wide	variety	of	means,	employing	distinct	theoretical	assumptions.		Second,	the	distance	metric	of	the	real	line	constrains	the	assessment	of	fit	between	clocks	in	the	set.		While	the	algorithm	that	weights	them	takes	degree	of	internal	agreement	as	the	standard	for	higher	weighting,	the	metrical	structure	of	the	space	in	which	relative	rates	of	the	clocks	are	assessed	ensures	relative	agreement	cannot	be	stipulated,	fudged,	or	gerrymandered.		The	clocks	need	to	cooperate	by	performing	stably	enough	that	they	may	be	compared	with	a	high	degree	of	precision,	and	this	stable	point	remains	tethered	to	a	robust	regularity	in	the	world	through	checks	with	the	convergent	behavior	of	caesium.		 While	UTC	is	in	some	respects	atypical	(see	footnote	1),	these	three	features	—	internal	coordination	of	outcomes,	empirical	checks,	and	directed	improvement	constrained	by	the	real	line	—	are	features	of	scientific	measurement	in	general.		What	Tal’s	discussion	of	the	UTC	obscures	is	the	sheer	number	of	empirical	checks	typically	involved,	and	the	strictness	of	the	demands	placed	by	conformity	to	the	metric	of	improvement	the	measuring	space	provides.		In	official	determinations	of	fundamental	physical	constants,	convergence	is	demanded	across	all	measurement	procedures,	as	assessed	by	the	law-governed	interrelationship	between	physical	quantities,	and	the	degree	of	precision	achieved	illustrates	the	strictness	of	this	demand.		For	instance,	in	late	19th	century	measurements	of	NA	by	Perrin	and	e	(charge	of	electron)	by	Thomson,	only	2	to	3	significant	figures	were	typically	obtained	within	method,	and	convergence	across	methods	often	only	agreed	as	to	order	of	magnitude.		By	1911,	Millikan	was	measuring	both	e	and	NA	to	4	significant	figures,	and	demonstrating	that	the	models	employed	to	calibrate	the	oil	drop	method	converged	closely	with	other	aspects	of	physical	theory	(1911).		As	of	2014,	NA	was	being	measured	at	upwards	of	9	significant	figures,	and	e	upwards	of	11	(Mohr	et	al.	2016).4		In	each	case,	the	increase	in	precision	has	been	constrained	by	the	antecedent	structure	of	the	real	line,	and	thus	is	not	itself	a	matter	of	mere	convention	or	coherence.		Rather,	the	world	must	cooperate	by	remaining																																																									4	It	is	expected	that	after	the	2018	26th	General	Conference	on	Weights	and	Measures,	NA	and	e	will	be	fixed	as	constants	to	which	other	quantities	may	be	referred	during	measurement.		
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sufficiently	stable	if	such	precision	is	to	be	possible;	consequently,	precise	values	constitute	robust	evidence	for	points	of	objective	fixity	in	the	world	revealed	through	measurement.		§4	Conclusion:	Fixed-Point	Realism		Traditional	scientific	realism	rests	on	an	abductive	inference	from	observed	empirical	success	to	presumed	underlying	causes.		Successful	measurement	may	certainly	be	used	in	such	an	inference,	but	I	claim	here	that	it	non-abductively	supports	a	more	modest	realism:				
Fixed	Point	Realism	–	values	obtained	through	successful	measurement	veridically	represent	objective	fixed	points	in	the	world,	which	may	be	exhaustively	characterized	by	the	pattern	of	distances	that	obtain	between	them	in	a	metric	space.		FPR	is	a	form	of	epistemic	structural	realism.		It	differs	from	traditional	realism	insofar	as	it	claims	a	veridical	characterization	of	the	world	is	possible	independent	of	any	particular	theoretical	description.		Our	theory	of	the	nature	of	temperature	or	of	state	changes	may	change	radically,	yet	the	points	of	relative	stability	characterizing,	e.g.,	boiling	point	of	water,	“absolute	zero,”	freezing	point	of	oxygen,	etc.,	will	stay	robust	across	any	such	change,	and	that	robustness	may	be	represented	by	their	relative	positions	within	a	numerical	scale.				 FPR	differs	from	other	flavors	of	structural	realism	in	the	type	of	structure	to	which	it	is	committed.		Structural	realists	typically	focus	on	the	rich	mathematical	structure	of	physical	theory,	and	derivation	or	limit	relations	that	hold	between	successive	theories,	e.g.	Newton’s	laws	are	a	limit	case	of	relativistic	mechanics	(Worrall	1989).		FPR	commits	itself	only	to	geometric	structure,	i.e.	the	pattern	of	relative	distances	that	obtain	between	points	of	stability	as	represented	in	a	metric	space.		Just	as	our	theoretical	description	of	these	stable	points	may	change,	so	may	our	mathematical	account	of	their	relationship	—	if	new	mathematical	physics	fails	to	derive	old	equations	as	limit	cases,	this	in	no	way	jeopardizes	the	veridicality	of	this	geometric	structure.		 Finally,	FPR	disagrees	with	coherentism,	insofar	as	it	asserts	that	the	geometrical	structure	uncovered	through	acts	of	successive	measurement	obtains	in	the	world	independent	of	our	practices.		It	does	not	deny	the	importance	of	epistemic	loops	for	understanding	the	process	of	measurement.		Nevertheless,	it	takes	convergence	in	measured	values	to	indicate	that	the	points	of	stability	they	represent	obtain	independent	of	the	theoretical	commitments	encapsulated	in	the	models	used	for	calibration.		Likewise,	it	takes	increased	precision	to	constitute	a	criterion	for	measurement	success	over	and	above	that	of	coherence,	one	that	is	only	realized	when	the	interest-independent	world	cooperates	with	us	by	remaining	stable	when	we	probe	it.						
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